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Abstract—This paper investigates the physical-layer security
for a random indoor visible light communication (VLC) network
with imperfect channel state information (CSI) and a protected
zone. The VLC network consists of three nodes, i.e., a transmitter
(Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve).
Alice is fixed in the center of the ceiling, and the emitted signal
at Alice satisfies the non-negativity and the dimmable average
optical intensity constraint. Bob and Eve are randomly deployed
on the receiver plane. By employing the protected zone and
considering the imperfect CSI, the stochastic characteristics of
the channel gains for both the main and the eavesdropping
channels is first analyzed. After that, the closed-form expressions
of the average secrecy capacity and the lower bound of secrecy
outage probability are derived, respectively. Finally, Monte-Carlo
simulations are provided to verify the accuracy of the derived
theoretical expressions. Moreover, the impacts of the nominal
optical intensity, the dimming target, the protected zone and the
imperfect CSI on secrecy performance are discussed, respectively.
Index Terms—Visible light communications, Average secrecy
capacity, Secrecy outage probability, Imperfect CSI, Randomly
deployed receivers, Protected zone.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in light-emitting diodes (LEDs) are de-
riving a resurgence into the use of visible-light for wire-
less communications. This novel technology is called visible
light communications (VLC) [1]. While the radio frequency
wireless communications (RFWC) serve outdoor users or fast
moving vehicular users, VLC can serve indoor users in future
fifth generation (5G) wireless communications. Therefore, in
future 5G technologies, VLC is considered to be a compelling
technology for supplementing RFWC [2].
To improve system performance, a lot of work has been
presented in the last decade to investigate VLC in terms of
channel modelling [3], channel capacity analysis [4], modula-
tion [5], coding [6], indoor positioning [7], underwater com-
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munication [8], and hardware design [9]. Although extensive
work on VLC has been performed, most of them focus on the
point-to-point (P2P) communications. Nowadays, the research
focus is being changed from P2P communications to network-
ing aspects. Under VLC network scenarios, the data privacy
and confidentiality are becoming more and more important for
users. However, in many practical VLC scenarios, multiple
LEDs are often employed for better illumination and thus
the eavesdroppers are able to perform interception as long as
they are in the area illuminated by one or multiple LEDs.
Moreover, even when eavesdroppers are not allowed to access
the specified area, they may still be capable of intercepting the
information through the structure of the physical environment,
such as keyholes and windows [10]. Therefore, the security is
still a crucial issue for VLC, even if it is more advantageous
than RFWC in terms of inherent security.
Recently, the physical-layer security (PLS) has emerged
as a promising solution to protect information delivery from
eavesdropping. In RFWC, the PLS has been extensively in-
vestigated. However, the derived results in RFWC cannot be
directly applied to VLC for the following reasons [11]: (a)
The transmitted optical intensity signal in VLC must be non-
negative, while the signals in RFWC are with bipolar complex
values; (b) The illumination and communication are simul-
taneously implemented in VLC, while only communication
is considered in RFWC; and (c) the dimming control is an
important consideration in VLC for power savings and energy
efficiency, which is not considered in RFWC. Compared to
the numerous studies in RFWC, few work has been presented
for PLS in VLC. As a fundamental performance indicator, the
secrecy capacity of VLC has been investigated [12]–[16]. In
[12], the secrecy capacity for a direct current based multiple
input single output (MISO) VLC is analyzed, and a uniform
input distribution is employed to derive the secrecy capacity
bound. By using a truncated generalized normal (TGN) input
distribution, the secrecy capacity and secure beamforming for
MISO VLC are investigated in [13] and [14], respectively.
Considering the signal constraints of VLC, the uniform and
TGN input distributions are generally not optimal. By using
the variational method, an improved input distribution can
be obtained [4]. By employing the variational method, three
lower bounds of secrecy capacity for VLC are obtained in
[15], where the upper bounds are obtained in [16]. Note that
refs. [12]–[16] focus on the fixed transceivers. To achieve
a better understanding of the inherent security capabilities
of VLC, more practical conditions (such as the distribution
of randomly deployed receivers) should be considered. By
employing the uniformly distributed receivers, the secrecy
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2outage probability (SOP) for the hybrid VLC/RFWC system
is studied in [17]. With spatially random terminals in VLC,
the closed-form expressions for the SOP and the average
secrecy capacity (ASC) are derived in [18]. In [19] and
[20], the SOP and beamforming are analyzed respectively
for VLC with randomly located eavesdroppers. However, the
dimming requirement for indoor VLC is not considered in
[17]–[20]. Moreover, the aforementioned works are carried
out by assuming that the channel state information (CSI) is
perfect. In practice, it is difficult to obtain perfect CSI because
of channel estimation and quantization errors.
In this paper, the PLS for indoor VLC is further investigated.
A more realistic three-node secure VLC network is estab-
lished, which includes a transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and
an eavesdropper. At the transmitter, the transmit visible-light
signal satisfies the non-negativity and the dimmable average
optical intensity constraint. To improve the secure perfor-
mance, an eavesdropper-free protected zone is employed. Both
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are uniformly
distributed. Moreover, the imperfect CSI at the receiver (CSIR)
is considered for both the main and the eavesdropping chan-
nels. The main contribution of this paper is the derivation of
closed-form expressions of the ASC and the lower bound of
SOP for the VLC network with the imperfect CSIR and the
protected zone. Based on the derived theoretical expressions,
some interesting insights are provided. Finally, Monte-Carlo
simulations are provided to verify the accuracy of the derived
theoretical expressions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, the random channel
characteristics is shown. Then, Section IV and Section V
derive the closed-from expressions of the ASC and the lower
bound of SOP, respectively. Numerical results are provided in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider an indoor VLC network,
which includes a transmitter (i.e., Alice), a legitimate receiver
(i.e., Bob), and an eavesdropping receiver (i.e., Eve). For
Alice, one LED is employed as the lighting source, which
is installed in the center of the ceiling to ensure the illumi-
nation and transfer information to Bob. When Alice transmits
information to Bob, Eve as an eavesdropper can also receive
the information. At both Bob and Eve, the photodiode (PD) is
employed to receive the information and perform the optical-
to-electrical convention.
To facilitate the analysis, the receiver zone S is assumed to
be a disc with radius D, and the projection of Alice on the
receiver zone is the center of the disc (i.e., point O), as shown
in Fig. 1. To improve the secure performance, a protected
zone P is employed [21], which is also a disc with center
O and radius ρ. The protected zone is an eavesdropper-free
area, which is formed either inherently or intentionally [22].
Therefore, we assume that Bob is uniformly distributed in zone
S, and Eve is uniformly distributed in zone S\P . According
to the above setup, the probability density functions (PDFs)
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Fig. 1. An indoor VLC network with a protected zone.
of the positions of Bob and Eve are, respectively, given by{
fU (u) =
1
piD2 , u ∈ S
fW (w) =
1
pi(D2−ρ2) , w ∈ S\P , (1)
where U and W denote the positions of Bob and Eve.
Without loss of generality, we assume that both Bob and
Eve can be illuminated by the LED, and thus the incidence
angle ψk (k = B for Bob, and k = E for Eve) cannot exceed
the field of view of the PD Ψc, i.e., 0 ≤ ψk ≤ Ψc. In indoor
VLC, the channel gain Hk can be written as [3]
Hk =
(m+ 1)A
2pid2k
Tsgcos
m(φk) cos(ψk), k = B or E, (2)
where dk and φk denote the distance and the irradiance angle
between Alice and Bob (or Eve); A denotes the physical area
of the PD, m is the order of the Lambertian emission, g is the
concentrator gain of the PD, Ts is the optical filter gain.
Moreover, the normal vectors of the transceiver planes
are supposed to be perpendicular to the ceiling, and thus
cos(φk)= cos(ψk)=l/dk, where l is the vertical height be-
tween Alice and the receiver plane. Therefore, the channel
gain in (2) can be further written as
Hk =
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
(r2k + l
2)−
m+3
2 , k = B or E, (3)
where rk is the distance between the projection point O and
the k-th receiver, as shown in Fig. 1.
Owing to the channel estimation error, the CSIR is im-
perfect. According to the ellipsoidal approximation, the CSI
uncertainty can be deterministically modeled as [23]
Hˆk = 10
ηk
10Hk, |ηk| ≤ ε, k = B or E, (4)
where ηk is the uncertain parameter, ε is the uncertainty bound.
Therefore, the received signals at Bob and Eve can be
written as {
YB = HˆBX + ZB
YE = HˆEX + ZE
, (5)
where X denotes the input optical intensity signal; ZB ∼
N(0, σ2B) and ZE ∼ N(0, σ2E) are the additive white Gaussian
noises at Bob and Eve, and σ2B and σ
2
E are the corresponding
noise variances.
3In VLC, the intensity modulation and direct detection
(IM/DD) are often employed, and thus X in (5) must satisfy
the non-negative constraint, i.e.,
X ≥ 0. (6)
To satisfy the illumination requirement, the average optical
intensity cannot change with time. Therefore, the dimmable
average optical intensity constraint is expressed as
E(X)=ξP, (7)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the dimming target, P is the nominal
optical intensity of the LED.
III. CHANNEL CHARACTERISTICS ANALYSIS
In this paper, Bob and Eve are spatially random deployed
receivers. The stochastic characteristics of the channel gains
for both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel will
be analyzed in this section.
According to Fig. 1, eqs. (1) and (3), the PDFs of HB and
HE are derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When Bob is uniformly distributed in zone S
and Eve is uniformly distributed in zone S\P , the PDFs of
HB and HE are given, respectively, by
fHB(h)=Ξ1h
− 2m+3−1, vmin ≤ h ≤ vmax, (8)
and
fHE(h)=Ξ2h
− 2m+3−1, vmin ≤ h ≤ vmid, (9)
where Ξ1, Ξ2, vmin, vmid and vmax are expressed as
Ξ1 =
2
(m+ 3)D2
(
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
, (10)
Ξ2 =
2
(m+ 3)(D2 − ρ2)
(
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
, (11)
vmin =
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
(D2 + l2)−
m+3
2 , (12)
vmid=
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
(ρ2 + l2)−
m+3
2 , (13)
and
vmax=
(m+ 1)ATsgl
m+1
2pi
l−(m+3). (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: When Bob is uniformly deployed in zone S and
Eve is uniformly distributed in zone S\P , both (8) and (9) are
monotonically decreasing functions with respect to h. When
ρ= 0 in (9), the protected zone disappears, the distribution of
HE is the same as that of HB. Moreover, with the increase of
ρ, the value of vmid in (9) decreases, and thus the curve of
fHE(h) is compressed to the left.
To justify Remark 1, Fig. 2 shows the comparisons between
the PDF of HB and the PDF of HE when m = Ts = g = 1,
A= 1cm2, l = 3m and D = 5m. According to this figure, it
can be observed that the above remark is verified.
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Fig. 2. Comparisons between the PDF of HB and the PDF of HE when
m = Ts = g = 1, A= 1cm2, l = 3m and D = 5m.
IV. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the ASC performance for the random VLC
network will be analyzed. By considering the imperfect CSIR,
the randomly deployed receivers and protected zone for VLC,
the instantaneous secrecy capacity (SC) cannot be used to
evaluate the system performance. Based on the derived instan-
taneous SC result in our previous work [16], the ASC will be
analyzed to evaluate the secrecy performance. Moreover, some
insights will also be provided.
In our previous work [16], tight lower and upper bounds
on the instantaneous SC for indoor VLC has been derived.
Without loss of generality, a lower bound on the instantaneous
SC in [16] is employed to analyze the ASC, which is shown
in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: For VLC with constraints (6) and (7), a lower
bound on the instantaneous SC is given by
Cs=
{
1
2 ln
(
σ2E
2piσ2B
· eξ2P 2H2B+2piσ2B
H2Eξ
2P 2+σ2E
)
, if χ′HB ≥ HE
0, otherwise
. (15)
where χ′ ∆=
√
eσE/(
√
2piσB).
In Lemma 1, the lower bound (15) is derived based on the
perfect CSIR. In this paper, when considering the imperfect
CSIR, the lower bound (15) should be modified as
Cs =
{
C+s , if χHB ≥ HE
0, otherwise
, (16)
where χ ∆= 10
ηB−ηE
10
√
eσE/(
√
2piσB), and C+s is given by
C+s =
1
2
ln
(
σ2E
2piσ2B
· eξ
2P 210
ηB
5 H2B + 2piσ
2
B
10
ηE
5 H2Eξ
2P 2 + σ2E
)
. (17)
According to (16), the ASC for the random VLC network
is defined as
Cs =
∫ vmid
vmin
∫ vmax
vmin
CsfHB(x)fHE(y)dxdy. (18)
Note that (18) holds because HB and HE are independent of
each other. In (18), Cs is positive for some cases, while the
value of Cs is zero for other cases. Moreover, the value of (18)
also depends on the integral region. Fig. 3 shows five cases
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Fig. 3. Five cases of the integral region of (18).
of the integral region in (18). According to the five cases, the
ACS in (18) can be written as
Cs=

0, if χ < vminvmax∫ vmax
vmin
χ
fHB(x)
∫ χx
vmin
C+s fHE(y)dydx, if
vmin
vmax
≤χ< vmidvmax∫ vmid
vmin
fHE(y)
∫ vmax
y
χ
C+s fHB(x)dxdy, if
vmid
vmax
≤χ<1∫ vmid
χ
vmin
fHB(x)
∫ χx
vmin
C+s fHE(y)dydx
+
∫ vmax
vmid
χ
fHB(x)
∫ vmid
vmin
C+s fHE(y)dydx, if 1≤χ< vmidvmin∫ vmax
vmin
fHB(x)
∫ vmid
vmin
C+s fHE(y)dydx, if χ≥ vmidvmin
(19)
By solving (19), the theoretical expression of the ASC is
derived as the following theorem.
Theorem 2: By considering the imperfect CSIR and pro-
tected zone, the ASC for the random VLC network with
constraints (6) and (7) are given by
Cs=

0, if χ < vminvmax
C1, if
vmin
vmax
< χ ≤ vmidvmax
C2, if
vmid
vmax
< χ ≤ 1
C3, if 1 < χ ≤ vmidvmin
C4, if χ >
vmid
vmin
, (20)
where C1 is given by
C1 =
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
[
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmin
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
− χ− 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
,
vmin
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
− χ 2m+3λ
(
m+ 3
4
, vmin, χvmax,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
+ v
− 2m+3
max λ
(
m+ 3
2
, vmin, χvmax,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)]
, (21)
Moreover, C2 and C3 are given by (22) and (23) as shown at
the top of the next page. C4 is given by
C4=
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
[(
v
− 2m+3
min −v
− 2m+3
mid
)
λ
(
m+3
2
,vmin,vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−
(
v
− 2m+3
min −v
− 2m+3
max
)
λ
(
m+3
2
,vmin,vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)]
, (24)
where λ(a, b, c, d) in (21)-(24) is defined as
λ(a, b, c, d) = a
(
b−
1
a − c− 1a
)
ln
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
)
+
1
2
c−
1
aG1,33,3
[
dξ2P 2c2
∣∣∣∣ 1, 1, 1+ 12a1, 12a , 0
]
− 1
2
b−
1
aG1,33,3
[
dξ2P 2b2
∣∣∣∣ 1, 1, 1+ 12a1, 12a , 0
]
, (25)
and Gc,da,b[·] denotes the Merjer’s G function [24].
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2: From Theorem 2, with the increase of the un-
certain parameter ηB, χ increases, and the integral range
of the ASC also enlarges. Therefore, the ASC will increase
with the increase of ηB. This indicates that the larger the
uncertain parameter of the main channel is, the better the
secure performance becomes. Similarly, we can also conclude
that the ASC performance degrades with the increase of ηE.
Remark 3: With the increase of P , the integral range of
the ASC does not change, but the instantaneous SC increases
first and then tends to a stable value, and thus the ASC also
increases first and then tends to a stable value.
Remark 4: Intuitively, when the radius ρ is larger, the
feasible zone of Eve (i.e., S\P) becomes smaller. In this
case, the eavesdropping channel gets worse than the main
channel. Therefore, with the increase of the radius ρ, the ASC
performance improves. Oppositely, when ρ = 0, Eve can be
deployed in the same zone as Bob, the worst ASC achieves.
In a word, the secrecy performance improves by using the
protected zone, however, the complexity of the system also
increases. Therefore, a tradeoff between secrecy performance
and system cost should be considered for practical systems.
V. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the SOP for the random VLC network
with imperfect CSI will be derived. It is very hard to obtain
a closed-form expression for the exact SOP. Alternatively,
a closed-form expression for a lower bound of the SOP is
derived.
To facilitate the analysis, the instantaneous SC in (16) can
be further written as
Cs =
{
1
2 ln
(
1+JB
1+JE
)
, ifχHB ≥ HE
0, otherwise
, (26)
where JB and JE are defined as JB =
10
ηB
5 eξ2P 2H2B
2piσ2B
JE =
10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2H2E
σ2E
. (27)
According to (8), the PDF of JB is given by [25]
fJB(j) =
Ξ1
2
(
2piσ2B
eξ2P 210
ηB
5
)− 1m+3
j−
1
m+3−1,
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 v2min
2piσ2B
≤j≤ eξ
2P 210
ηB
5 v2max
2piσ2B
.(28)
5C2=
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
[
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmin
χ
,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−χ− 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
,
vmin
χ
,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
+
(
v
− 2m+3
min − v
− 2m+3
mid
)
×λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmid
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−χ 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
+v
− 2m+3
max λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)]
, (22)
C3 =
m+3
4
Ξ1Ξ2
{
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−χ− 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
, vmin,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−
[
v
− 2m+3
min −
(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3]
×λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin, χvmin,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
−χ 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
, χvmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
+
(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3
λ
(
m+3
2
, χvmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
+
(
v
− 2m+3
min −v
− 2m+3
mid
)
λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmid
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−
[(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3
− v−
2
m+3
max
]
λ
(
m+ 3
2
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)}
, (23)
BJ
EJ
BJ
EJ0 0
B th EJ J B
J
EJ0
BJ
EJ0
B th EJ J
(a) (b)
(d) (e)
BJ
EJ0
B th EJ J
(c)
B,maxJ
B,minJ
E,minJ E,maxJ
B,maxJ
B,minJ
B,maxJ
B,minJ
E,minJ
B th EJ J
B,min
th
J
 E,minJ E,maxJE,maxJ
E,minJ E,maxJ
B,maxJ
B,minJ
B,max
th
J

B,maxJ
B,minJ
E,minJ E,maxJ
B th EJ J
Fig. 4. Five cases of the integral region of (31).
Similarly, according to (9), the PDF of JE is given by [25]
fJE(j) =
Ξ2
2
(
σ2E
10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2
)− 1m+3
j−
1
m+3−1,
10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2v2min
σ2E
≤ j ≤ 10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2v2mid
σ2E
. (29)
Moreover, eq. (26) can be further expressed as
Cs =
{
1
2 ln
(
1+JB
1+JE
)
, if JB ≥ JE
0, otherwise
. (30)
According to (30), the SOP is defined as
PSOP = Pr
(
1
2
ln
(
1 + JB
1 + JE
)
≤ 1
2
ln γth
)
= Pr (JB ≤ (1 + JE)γth − 1)
≥ Pr (JB ≤ JEγth) ∆= PLSOP (31)
where γth ≥ 1 denotes the equivalent threshold of the signal-
to-noise ratio.
Note that the value of (31) also depends on the integral
region. Fig. 4 shows five cases of the integral region in (31).
According to the five cases, the lower bound of SOP in (31)
can be written as
PLSOP=

0, if γth ≤ χ2 v
2
min
v2mid∫JE,max
JB,min
γth
fJE(z)
∫γthz
JB,min
fJB(y)dydz, ifχ
2 v
2
min
v2mid
<γth≤χ2∫JE,max
JE,min
fJE(z)
∫γthz
JB,min
fJB(y)dydz, ifχ
2<γth≤χ
2v2max
v2mid∫ JB,max
γth
JE,min
fJE(z)
∫γthz
JB,min
fJB(y)dydz+∫ JE,max
JB,max
γth
fJE(z)
∫JB,max
JB,min
fJB(y)dydz, if
χ2v2max
v2mid
<γth≤χ
2v2max
v2min
1, if γth>χ
2 v
2
max
v2min
, (32)
where JB,min =
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 v2min
2piσ2B
, JB,max =
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 v2max
2piσ2B
,
JE,min =
10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2v2min
σ2E
, and JE,max =
10
ηE
5 ξ2P 2v2mid
σ2E
.
By solving (32), the closed-form expression of the lower
bound of the SOP is obtained in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: By considering the imperfect CSIR and pro-
tected zone, the SOP for the random VLC network with
constraints (6) and (7) are given by
PSOP=

0, if γth ≤ χ2 v
2
min
v2mid
S1, if χ
2 v
2
min
v2mid
< γth ≤ χ2
S2, if χ
2 < γth ≤ χ2 v
2
max
v2mid
S3, if χ
2 v
2
max
v2mid
< γth ≤ χ2 v
2
max
v2min
1, if γth > χ
2 v
2
max
v2min
, (33)
where S1, S2 and S3 are given by
S1 = ψ(m+3)
2J
− 1m+3
B,min
[(
JB,min
γth
)− 1m+3
J
− 1m+3
E,max
]
− ψ
2
(m+3)2γ
− 1m+3
th
[(
JB,min
γth
)− 2m+3
−J−
2
m+3
E,max
]
, (34)
S2 = ψ(m+ 3)
2J
− 1m+3
B,min
(
J
− 1m+3
E,min − J
− 1m+3
E,max
)
− ψ
2
(m+ 3)2γ
− 1m+3
th
[
J
− 2m+3
E,min − J
− 2m+3
E,max
]
, (35)
6and
S3 =ψ(m+3)
2J
− 1m+3
B,min
[
J
− 1m+3
E,min −
(
JB,max
γth
)− 1m+3]
− ψ
2
(m+3)2γ
− 1m+3
th
[
J
− 2m+3
E,min −
(
JB,max
γth
)− 2m+3]
+ψ(m+3)2
(
J
− 1m+3
B,min−J
− 1m+3
B,max
)[(
JB,max
γth
)− 1m+3
−J−
1
m+3
E,max
]
, (36)
where ψ = Ξ1Ξ24
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 5: With the increase of γth, the value of the
lower bound of the SOP also enlarges. Finally, when γth >
χ2v2max
/
v2min, the lower bound of the SOP becomes one, and
the information cannot be transmitted securely.
Remark 6: Similar to Remark 4, the SOP performance can
also improve with the increase of ρ.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the derived theoretical expressions of the
ASC and the lower bound of the SOP will be verified by using
Monte-Carlo simulations. The main simulation parameters are
listed in Table I.
TABLE I
MAIN SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Order of Lambertian emission m 6
Physical area of PD Ar 1 cm2
Optical filter gain of PD Ts 1
Concentrator gain of PD g 3
Noise variances σ2B, σ
2
E 1
A. ASC results
Fig. 5 shows the ASC versus the nominal optical intensity P
with different ρ when ηB = 10, ηE = 1, l = 4m, and D = 8m.
As can be observed, when P is small, all ASCs are zeros. With
the increase of P , the ASCs increase and then tend to stable
values, which verifies Remark 3. Moreover, with the increase
of the radius ρ of the protected zone, the ASC performance
improves dramatically, which coincides with Remark 4. This
is because Eve is located farther away from Bob when the
protected zone is larger.
Fig. 6 plots the ASC versus the nominal optical intensity P
with different ηB when ρ = 4, ηE = 1, l = 4m, and D = 8m.
According to (4), it is known that the estimated channel gain
HˆB increases with the increase of ηB. Larger HˆB will lead to
a good ASC performance. Therefore, the ASC performance
improves with the increase of ηB, which consists with that in
Remark 2. This indicates that the larger the uncertainty of the
imperfect CSI, the larger the gap between the realistic ASC
and the estimated ASC becomes.
Fig. 7 shows ASC versus dimming target ξ for different
nominal optical intensity P when ρ = 2 m, ηB = 10, ηE = 1,
l = 4m, and D = 15m. As can be observed, the ASC increase
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Fig. 5. ASC versus nominal optical intensity P with different ρ when ηB =
10, ηE = 1, l = 4m, and D = 8m.
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Fig. 6. ASC versus nominal optical intensity P with different ηB when
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Fig. 7. ASC versus dimming target ξ for different nominal optical intensity
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Fig. 8. SOP versus ηB with different ηE when ρ = 4m, P = 60 dB,
l = 4m, D = 8m, and γth = 3.
with the increase of P , which consists with that in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6. Moreover, when P = 35 and 50 dB, the ASC varies
fast with dimming target. Moreover, the larger the dimming
target, the larger the ASC will be. However, when P = 70 dB,
the values of ASC are almost the same for different dimming
targets.
Moreover, it can be found from Fig. 5-Fig. 7 that all
theoretical results match simulation results very well, which
indicates the correctness of the theoretical analysis.
B. SOP results
Fig. 8 shows SOP versus ηB with different ηE when
ρ = 4m, P = 60 dB, l = 4m, D = 8m, and γth = 3.
As can be observed, the SOP performance improves with the
increase of ηB, and deteriorates with the increase of ηE. This
is because larger ηB and ηE will result in larger estimated
channel gains HˆB and HˆE, respectively. Larger HˆB leads to
better secrecy performance while larger HˆE leads to worse
secrecy performance.
Fig. 9 shows SOP versus ηB with different ρ when P = 60
dB, l = 4m, D = 8m, γth = 3, and ηE = 1. It can be observed
that the SOP performance improves with the increase of the
radius of the protected zone ρ, which consists with that in
Remark 6. Expanding protected zone decreases the estimated
eavesdropping channel gain HˆE, which improves the secrecy
performance of the VLC system.
Fig. 10 shows SOP versus ηB with different γth when
P = 60 dB, l = 4m, D = 8m, ηE = 1, and ρ = 4m.
It can be observed that the value of SOP becomes larger
as the increase of γth, which means that the system secrecy
performance is degrades. The conclusion derived in Fig. 10
verifies the correctness of Remark 5.
In Fig. 8-Fig. 10, it can be observed that the theoretical
values for the lower bound of SOP agree with the simulation
values for the lower bound, which verifies that the theoretical
analysis is correct. At the same time, the gap between the
theoretical lower bound and the exact simulation result is also
small, which indicates that the scaling method for deriving the
lower bound of SOP is reasonable.
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Fig. 9. SOP versus ηB with different ρ when P = 60 dB, l = 4m, D = 8m,
γth = 3, and ηE = 1.
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Fig. 10. SOP versus ηB with different γth when P = 60 dB, l = 4m,
D = 8m, ηE = 1, and ρ = 4m.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the PLS performance for a random
VLC network with Alice, Bob, and Eve. By considering the
protected zone, imperfect CSIR, and the randomness of Bob
and Eve, the closed-form expressions of the ASC and the
lower bound of the SOP are derived, respectively. Moreover,
some insights are obtained, which can be utilized for prac-
tical system design. Numerical results show that the gaps
between theoretical results and simulation results are small,
which indicates that the derived theoretical expressions can
be used to evaluate PLS for VLC. Moreover, it is shown
that the nominal optical intensity, the dimming target, the
protected zone and the imperfect CSI have strong impacts on
the secrecy performance. The derived theoretical expressions
and results regarding parameters that influence the secrecy
performance will enable system designers to quickly evaluate
system performance without time-consuming simulations and
determine the optimal available parameter choices when facing
different security risks.
8APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to Fig. 1, the projection of Alice on the receiver
zone is the center of zone S, and Bob is uniformly distributed
in zone S. Therefore, the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of rB is given by
FrB(rB) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ rB
0
1
piD2
rdrdθ =
r2B
D2
, 0 ≤ rB ≤ D. (A.1)
By using (A.1), the PDF of rB is further written as
frB(rB) =
dFrB(rB)
drB
=
2rB
D2
, 0 ≤ rB ≤ D. (A.2)
According to (3) and (A.2), the PDF of HB can be derived
as
fHB(h) =
d
dh
−
√(
(m+ 1)ATsglm+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
h−
2
m+3 − l2

× frB
√((m+1)ATsglm+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
h−
2
m+3−l2
, (A.3)
Therefore, eq. (8) holds.
Because Eve is uniformly distributed in zone S\P , the CDF
of rE is given by
FrE(rE) =
r2E − ρ2
D2 − ρ2 , ρ ≤ rE ≤ D. (A.4)
By using (A.1), the PDF of rE is further written as
frE(rE) =
2rE
D2 − ρ2 , ρ ≤ rE ≤ D. (A.5)
According to (3) and (A.5), the PDF of HE can be derived
as [25]
fHE(h) =
d
dh
−
√(
(m+1)ATsglm+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
h−
2
m+3 − l2

×frE
√((m+1)ATsglm+1
2pi
) 2
m+3
h−
2
m+3−l2
,(A.6)
Therefore, eq. (9) can be easily derived.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Case 1: When χ ≤ vmin/vmax, by observing Fig. 3, Cs= 0
is straightforward.
Case 2: When vmin/vmax < χ ≤ vmid/vmax, we have
C1=
∫ vmax
vmin
χ
1
2
ln
[
σ2E
(
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 x2+2piσ2B
)]
fHB(x)
∫ χx
vmin
fHE(y)dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
−
∫ χvmax
vmin
1
2
ln
[
2piσ2B
(
10
ηE
5 y2ξ2P 2+σ2E
)]
fHE(y)
∫ vmax
y
χ
fHB(x)dxdy︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
,(B.1)
where I1 can be written as
I1 =
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
[
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmin
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
− χ− 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
,
vmin
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)]
. (B.2)
Similarly, I2 in (B.1) can be derived as
I2 =
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
[
χ
2
m+3λ
(
m+3
4
, vmin, χvmax,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
− v−
2
m+3
max λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin, χvmax,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)]
. (B.3)
By submitting (B.2) and (B.3) into (B.1), C1 can be derived.
Case 3: when vmid/vmax < χ ≤ 1, we can get (B.4) as
shown at the top of the next page, where D1 can be written
as
D1 =
m+3
2
[
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmin
χ
,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
− χ− 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
,
vmin
χ
,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)]
. (B.5)
For D2 in (B.4), we have
D2=
m+3
2
(
v
− 2m+3
min −v
− 2m+3
mid
)
λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmid
χ
, vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
.(B.6)
For D3 in (B.4), we have
D3 =
m+3
2
[
χ
2
m+3λ
(
m+3
4
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
− v−
2
m+3
max λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)]
. (B.7)
By submitting (B.5), (B.6) and (B.7) into (B.4), C2 can be
derived.
Case 4: When 1 < χ ≤ vmid/vmin, we have
C3 =
∫ vmid
χ
vmin
fHB(x)
∫ χx
vmin
CLows,2 fHE(y)dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+
∫ vmax
vmid
χ
fHB(x)
∫ vmid
vmin
CLows,2 fHE(y)dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
, (B.8)
where A1 and A2 can be written as
A1=
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
{
v
− 2m+3
min λ
(
m+3
2
,vmin,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−χ− 2m+3
×λ
(
m+3
4
, vmin,
vmid
χ
,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−
[
v
− 2m+3
min −
(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3]
×λ
(
m+3
2
,vmin,χvmin,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
−χ 2m+3λ
(
m+3
4
,χvmin,vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)
+
(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3
λ
(
m+3
2
, χvmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)}
. (B.9)
9C2=
Ξ1Ξ2
2

∫ vmid
χ
vmin
χ
ln
[
σ2E
(
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 x2+2piσ2B
)]
x−
m+5
m+3
∫ χx
vmin
y−
m+5
m+3 dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
+
∫ vmax
vmid
χ
ln
[
σ2E
(
eξ2P 210
ηB
5 x2+2piσ2B
)]
x−
m+5
m+3
∫ vmid
vmin
y−
m+5
m+3 dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
−
∫ vmid
vmin
ln
[
2piσ2B
(
10
ηE
5 y2ξ2P 2 + σ2E
)]
y−
m+5
m+3
∫ vmax
y
χ
x−
m+5
m+3 dxdy︸ ︷︷ ︸
D3
 , (B.4)
and
A2=
(m+3)Ξ1Ξ2
4
{(
v
− 2m+3
min −v
− 2m+3
mid
)
λ
(
m+3
2
,
vmid
χ
,vmax,
e10
ηB
5
2piσ2B
)
−
[(
vmid
χ
)− 2m+3
−v−
2
m+3
max
]
λ
(
m+3
2
, vmin, vmid,
10
ηE
5
σ2E
)}
. (B.10)
Submitting (B.9) and (B.10) into (B.8), C3 can be finally
derived.
Case 5: When χ > vmid/vmin, we have
C4=A2|χ= vmidvmin (B.11)
After some simplifications, C4 can be finally derived.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Case 1: When γth ≤ χ2 v
2
min
v2mid
, we have PLSOP = 0.
Case 2: When χ2 v
2
min
v2mid
≤ γth ≤ χ2, we have
PLSOP =
Ξ1Ξ2
4
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× J−
1
m+3
B,min
[(
JB,min
γth
)− 1m+3
− J−
1
m+3
E,max
]
− Ξ1Ξ2
8
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× γ−
1
m+3
th
[(
JB,min
γth
)− 2m+3
− J−
2
m+3
E,max
]
. (C.1)
Case 3: When χ2 ≤ γth ≤ χ2 v
2
max
v2mid
, we have
PLSOP =
Ξ1Ξ2
4
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× J−
1
m+3
B,min
[
J
− 1m+3
E,min − J
− 1m+3
E,max
]
− Ξ1Ξ2
8
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× γ−
1
m+3
th
[
J
− 2m+3
E,min − J
− 2m+3
E,max
]
. (C.2)
Case 4: When χ2 v
2
max
v2mid
≤ γth ≤ χ2 v
2
max
v2min
, we can get
PLSOP =
Ξ1Ξ2
4
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× J−
1
m+3
B,min
[
J
− 1m+3
E,min −
(
JB,max
γth
)− 1m+3]
− Ξ1Ξ2
8
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+ 3)2
× γ−
1
m+3
th
[
J
− 2m+3
E,min −
(
JB,max
γth
)− 2m+3]
+
Ξ1Ξ2
4
(
2piσ2Bσ
2
E
10
ηE+ηB
5 eξ4P 4
)− 1m+3
(m+3)2
×
[
J
− 1m+3
B,min −J
− 1m+3
B,max
][(
JB,max
γth
)− 1m+3
−J−
1
m+3
E,max
]
.(C.3)
Case 5: When γth ≥ χ2 v
2
max
v2min
, we have PLSOP = 1.
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